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Abstract 
This document reports on outcomes from the OGC Web Services Shibboleth 
Interoperability Experiment (OSI).  The main objective of OSI was to advance the use of 
Shibboleth (an open source implementation of SAML) as a means of protecting OWS.  In 
the process, OSI helped develop further understanding of this approach to establishing 
trusted federations of OWS.  This report documents these findings and is intended to be 
of use to those interested in how Shibboleth/SAML access management federations may 
function as an organisational model for operational Spatial Data Infrastructure. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope of document 
This document reports on outcomes from the OGC Web Services Shibboleth 
Interoperability Experiment (OSI).  The main objective of OSI was to advance the use of 
Shibboleth (an open source implementation of SAML) as a means of protecting OWS.  In 
the process, OSI helped develop further understanding of this approach to establishing 
trusted federations of OWS.  This report documents these findings and is intended to be 
of use to those interested in how Shibboleth/SAML access management federations may 
function as an organisational model for operational Spatial Data Infrastructure. 
1.2 Document contributor contact points 
All questions regarding this document should be directed to the editor or the contributors: 
Name Organization e-mail 
Chris  Higgins EDINA  chris.higgins<at>ed.ac.uk 
Andreas Matheus Secure Dimensions GmbH Am(at>secure-
dimensions.com 
   
 
1.3 Revision history 
Date Release Editor Primary clauses 
modified 
Description 
Feb 2011 V1.0.0 Chris  Higgins Initial ER First draft in time for the Bonn TC 
Feb 2011 V1.0.1 Andreas 
Matheus 
Throughout Comments, edits and corrections 
Feb 2012 V2.0.0 Chris Higgins Second draft.  
Results section 
Mainly additions to the results 
sections from those IE participants 
who provided text. 
 
1.4 Future work 
The work described in this document describes a solution to a fundamental problem 
obstructing the advancement of Spatial Data Infrastructures (SDI) - where resources need 
to be protected, how can OWS in different administrative domains be secured in a 
genuinely interoperable way so that only properly authenticated users gain access?  This 
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has the potential to lead to a significant amount of future work in many different related 
areas; some of which is documented here and in related publications, eg, Higgins et al, 
2012.    
In particular, this document would be improved by greater detail being made available by 
implementing organizations on the issues encountered when modifying client software to 
undergo Shibboleth/SAML interactions and broader issues encountered when employing 
SAML access management federations to secure SDI.   
While Shibboleth presents a valuable open source and ad hoc SAML reference 
implementation, it should be noted that SAML components are already widely in use 
throughout the GI industry.  It may be anticipated that future work will involve the use of 
both open source and commercial implementations. 
1.5 Forward 
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be 
the subject of patent rights. The Open Geospatial Consortium Inc. shall not be held 
responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights. 
Recipients of this document are requested to submit, with their comments, notification of 
any relevant patent claims or other intellectual property rights of which they may be 
aware that might be infringed by any implementation of the standard set forth in this 
document, and to provide supporting documentation. 
2 References 
The following documents are referenced in this document. For dated references, 
subsequent amendments to, or revisions of, any of these publications do not apply. For 
undated references, the latest edition of the normative document referred to applies. 
Higgins, C., Koutroumpas, M., Matheus, A. and Seales, A (2012). “Shibboleth Access 
Management Federations as an Organisational Model for SDI”. International Journal of 
Spatial Data Infrastructures Research, Vol 7 (2012).  
http://ijsdir.jrc.ec.europa.eu/index.php/ijsdir/article/viewFile/245/295 [accessed Feb 
2012] 
OGC 06-121r3, OpenGIS® Web Services Common Standard 
OGC 06-042, OpenGIS® Web Map Service Implementation Specification, Version 1.3.0  
OGC 04-094, OpenGIS® Web Feature Service (WFS) Implementation Specification, 
Version 1.1.0 
OASIS 2005, Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), Version 2.0 
OGC  11-019r2Open Geospatial Consortium, Inc 
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OASIS 2005, Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0 
OASIS 2005, Bindings for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
V2.0 
3 Terms and definitions 
For the purposes of this report, the definitions specified in Clause 4 of the OWS Common 
Implementation Specification [OGC 06-121r3] shall apply. In addition, the definitions in 
OASIS SAML 2.0 shall apply. 
4 Conventions 
4.1 Abbreviated terms 
SAML  Security Assertion Markup Language 
IdP   Identity Provider 
SP   Service Provider 
SSO  Single Sign On 
SDI  Spatial Data Infrastructure 
5 OGC Web Services Shibboleth IE Overview 
As described in the OGC Reference Model, OGC services are defined using open non-
proprietary Internet standards such as HTTP, URL, MIME, XML, WSDL or SOAP. The 
usual interaction between clients and services is request-response, where the client first 
makes a request which is transferred by either HTTP GET or POST with XML/SOAP to 
the service and then expects a response back. 
There are plenty of scenarios where the service needs to know the identity of the 
requesting party before processing the request. Such scenarios include typical 
authorization use-cases (different permissions are associated with different requesters) 
and auditing. 
However, the OGC service specifications do not address the issue of transferring identity 
information together with the request. There have been plenty of approaches in the past 
addressing this issue both within the OGC, eg, through the activities of the GeoDRM 
DWG, GeoRM SWG, Security DWG, the OWS-3, OWS-4, OWS-5, OWS-6 initiatives, 
the Authentication IE, as well as through different non-OGC projects.  
Although this issue has been a “hot topic” for more than 5 years, there is still no best 
practice of how to transfer identity information between OGC clients and services. The 
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consequence of this is that few COTS products natively support basic security functions 
such as authentication and access control and whenever security is involved, typically an 
architecture with proxies / facades gets deployed (see picture below). 
 
 
There are various ways in which identity information can be transferred from the OGC 
client to the OGC service by leveraging the underlying transport protocols. Both HTTP 
and SOAP offer native support for embedding security information and there are several 
main-stream authentication protocols that leverage these features.  
Most importantly, by embedding the identity information in the transfer protocol the 
OGC service specifications are not touched at all, so the existing level of interoperability 
is not altered in any way. 
This IE set out to demonstrate publicly how this could be achieved with a range of clients 
using the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) standards from OASIS in 
association with the widely used open source implementation Shibboleth. 
5.1 Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
SAML is a product of the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee, it is an XML 
based open standard whose primary purpose is to enable the exchange of authentication 
data across security and policy domains.   
The main use case for SAML is Single Sign On (SSO): with SSO users authenticate at 
one web site, access the resource of interest, and are then able to access additional 
protected resources at other web sites.  SAML enables the communication of 
authentication information from the first site to additional sites in different security 
domains, these sites can then choose to authorise the user and allow access to the 
protected resource.    
An organisational pre-requisite for the use of SAML in this scenario is the existence of an 
identity management federation.  Federation in this case, means that a group of 
organisations with common business goals has established a circle of trust and formal 
understanding so that these cross-domain business interactions can take place.   
Most organisations with valuable online resources will have some form of identity 
management in place, the decoupling and abstraction of identity management in 
federations required to make these cross security domain decisions is standardised in 
SAML.  A key aspect is formal agreement on what security and identity information 
concerning the agent who is accessing the protected resource is required to enable 
COTS  
  
COTS  
  
Client-Side 
 
Server-Side 
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decisions to be taken as to whether they are authorised to access the resource or not.  This 
information is communicated as assertions (see Fig 1 below)  
 
Fig 1 Basic SAML Concepts (from the SAML Technical Overview) 
Figure 1 has been included mainly to indicate some of the flexibility of SAML and to 
provide some background for the technical decisions made when implementing OWS 
clients.  It has always been the intention that using Shibboleth to protect OWS should 
enable a wide range of different clients as typically found in SDI.  The SAML2 
components below support a number of use cases: 
− Assertions are basic packets of information containing statements about a 
principal (that which wants to access the protected resource) that an asserting 
party, ie, an IdP, claims to be true.  The SP then uses this information to make 
access control decisions.  This attribute based model gives great flexibility, eg, 
under circumstances where the principals full identity is not important, cant be 
shared for privacy reasons or is insufficient for an authorisation decision without 
additional information. 
− Protocols describe how assertions are packaged within SAML request and 
response elements, and gives the processing rules that SAML entities must follow 
when producing or consuming these elements. 
− Bindings are mappings of SAML protocol message onto standard messaging 
formats and/or communications protocols, eg, SOAP, HTTP. 
OGC  11-019r2Open Geospatial Consortium, Inc 
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− Profiles describes in detail how SAML assertions, protocols, and bindings 
combine to support a defined use case.  Two profiles were used in OSI to create 
two basic types of clients: Web Browser SSO Profile and Enhanced Client or 
Proxy (ECP) Profile. 
5.2 Shibboleth 
Shibboleth is an initiative from the US based Internet2 research and education 
networking consortium.  It is an open source package that allows the establishment of 
federations of trusted Identity Providers and Service Providers based on SAML.  It is a 
production strength solution to the problem of how to securely exchange user information 
based on open standards.  Shibboleth is being used daily by 100s of millions of users 
around the globe and there are Shibboleth based access management federations in most 
developed countries, including most of Europe.  For example, the UK Access 
Management Federation has approximately 8 million users.   
Shibboleth is based on open security standards such as SAML  (Security Access Markup 
Language), XML Signature, XML Encryption, etc.  A decentralised approach is taken; 
organisations within the federation take responsibility for authenticating their own users 
using whichever method their organisation traditionally uses or prefers.  In the language 
of Shibboleth, they act as Identity Providers (IdPs).  Figure 2 provides an example series 
of Shibboleth exchanges typical of the UK Access Management Federation.   
User
Where are 
you from 
(WAYF)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Identity 
Provider
(IdP)
Service 
Provider 
(SP)
 
 
Fig 2.  Example Shibboleth Interactions 
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1. User attempts to access a Shibboleth-protected resource on the Service Provider 
(SP) site. 
2. User is redirected to the “Where are you from” (WAYF) in order to select their 
home organisation – typically synonymous with Identity Provider (IdP). 
3. Part of same exchange as 2. 
4. IdP ensures that user is authenticated, by whatever means IdP deems appropriate 
5. After successful authentication, a one-time handle (a SAML artefact) is generated 
for this user session. 
6. SP uses the handle to request attribute information from the IdP for this user 
7. IdP allows or denies attribute information to be made available to this SP  
8. Based on the attribute information made available, SP makes authorisation 
decision, ie, allows or denies the user access to the resource. 
This may look complicated, but from the users perspective; they attempt to access a 
Shibboleth protected resource and the following happens: 
− they gain access immediately as they have previously authenticated - Shibboleth 
supports SSO, or 
− they get redirected to a list of organisations participating in the federation 
(WAYF) where, 
− they select their home organisation and provide their (familiar) credentials for 
login to the home organisation 
− they then either get access, or they don’t, with appropriate information supplied, 
eg, your institution does not subscribe to our service 
Behind the scenes, there is what can be a complicated sequence of exchanges taking 
place, involving the resolution of SAML artefacts and the release of SAML assertions 
concerning the subject in accordance with the IdPs attribute release policy.  Depending 
upon which SAML Profile or Binding is being used, this may be conducted over a secure 
encrypted back channel using SSL, SOAP, XML Encryption and XML Digital Signature.   
Note that whereas the philosophy behind Shibboleth is to devolve responsibility as much 
as possible – in the belief that enterprises themselves are best positioned to manage the 
identities of their members, there are still some components that must be centralised.  For 
example, in the UK Access Management Federation, the main WAYF (effectively a list 
mapping institution names to IdP URLs) is centralised in a trusted organisation, although 
many SPs choose to setup a decentralized WAYF (although there is still a dependency on 
the central WAFY).  Of course, policy has to be centralized as well. 
OGC  11-019r2Open Geospatial Consortium, Inc 
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As might be expected in an area as delicate as sharing information about users, policy is 
often the most involved aspect in establishing access management federations.  For 
example, each IdP maintains an attribute release policy.  Which attributes get released 
depends upon who the agent is and the resource being protected.  For example, in the 
UK, Data Protection Act considerations may prevent the users real name being made 
known (not necessarily a unique ID though), and certain attributes may only be released 
if its a student and SP 1, a lecturer and SP 2, etc.  
5.3 The ESDIN Project 
The EU/eContentPlus funded European Spatial Data Infrastructure with a Best Practice 
Network (ESDIN) project started in 2008 and ended in 2011.  The project consortium is 
comprised mainly of European National Mapping and Cadastral Agencies (NMCAs) and 
is led by EuroGeographics - a membership association that represents the interests of the 
NMCAs at the European level.  A key goal for ESDIN is to assist European member 
states with preparation of their data for INSPIRE, including issues relating to security and 
access management. 
5.3.1 The ESDIN Federation 
The ESDIN Federation was a test Shibboleth Access Management Federation established 
during the lifetime of the project.  It comprised of a number of NMCAs and European 
Universities - the latter as a secondary objective of ESDIN is to improve European 
academic sector access to NMCA data, partly using the offices of the 
OGC/AGILE/EuroSDR Persistent European Geospatial Testbed for Research and 
Education (PTB). 
One important result of work undertaken in setting up the ESDIN Federation was the 
demonstration that OGC Web Services (OWS) can be protected using the mainstream 
Shibboleth download.  No changes are required to either Shibboleth or the OGC 
interfaces in order to secure the OWS. 
However, changes are required to the client applications. Building on an earlier project, 
the JISC funded SEE-GEO1 project, a number of clients were developed during the 
course of ESDIN on top of open source software capable of undergoing the 
Shibboleth/SAML interactions. 
5.4 Scope of the IE 
The main objective of the IE was to advance the use of Shibboleth in conjunction with 
OWS services.  In doing so, we were aiming to develop implementation experience and 
flush out operational issues associated with this means of establishing trusted federations 
of OWS. 
                                                 
1 http://edina.ac.uk/projects/seesaw/seegeo/ 
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5.4.1 Within scope 
− Development of a number of OWS client applications capable of transferring identity 
information using Shibboleth  
− Expansion of the ESDIN Federation to provide the best possible basis for 
demonstration purposes 
− Demonstration of a variety of different vendor clients accessing Shibboleth protected 
OWS. 
− Provision of findings as an engineering report (this document) that may be taken 
forward as a candidate Best Practices document. 
− Provision of findings as part of an ESDIN Best Practice paper for use by 
organisations: 
− seeking to create Shibboleth Access Management Federations where a significant 
number of the service providers are providing OWS 
− wanting to setup services within Shibboleth Access Management Federations 
− creating clients capable of consuming services protected using Shibboleth Access 
Management Federations 
− wanting to understand the potential of, and issues associated with, Shibboleth 
Access Management Federations 
5.4.2 Out of scope 
The following issues were explicitly left out of the scope for the IE: 
− Metadata describing authentication capabilities of services. 
− Modifications of existing OGC service specifications (to accommodate 
authentication issues). 
− Authorization, audit or other security functions. 
− GeoRM.   
− E-commerce solutions.  The IE was focussed on Shibboleth Access Management 
Federations where it was assumed that legitimate users have pre-defined licence 
arrangements with Federation Service Providers in place.  More sophisticated 
arrangements layered on top of federations enabling various forms of licence 
negotiations can be envisaged, but were out of scope for the IE. 
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− Cross access management federation interoperability. 
6 Methodology 
The IE commenced in September 2010 with the first meeting being held in association 
with the Toulouse Technical Committee meeting.  Subsequently, the IE progressed using 
telcons, email list and a wiki on the OGC portal site. 
In addition to these, the usual IE tools, EDINA provided some one-to-one technical 
support (which then usually formed material for a FAQ) with the objective of assisting 
the participants develop their OWS clients in time for the Technology Integration 
Experiment on the 18th Nov 2010.   
6.1 Component development 
To further assist the software producers with modifying their OWS clients EDINA 
established a publicly available documented open source reference implementation of a 
desktop client.  This client is an implementation of the SAML Enhanced Client or Proxy 
(ECP) profile using the OpenJump software and is available here: 
http://esdin.fgi.fi/wiki/index.php/Esdin:AuthIE:Client 
6.2 Technology Integration Experiment 
This was the main vehicle for advancing the IE.  The original intention had been to have 
a “plugfest”, but after discussion with OGC staff it was decided that it would more 
appropriate to have an IE culminating in a Technology Interoperability Experiment (TIE).   
In discussion it was decided that this should be a virtual event and broadcast as a 
webinar.  During the event, the OSI participants who had modified their client software 
demonstrated using simple scripts distributed beforehand (table 1) a simple ESDIN SSO 
use case (table 2) using services within the ESDIN Federation.   
Table 1 Example script used during OSI Technology Interoperability Experiment 
SSO, 
Desktop Client, 
WMS 
ED
IN
A
 
C
adcorp 
Envitia 
1 Attempt access protected service User not previously 
authenticated 
   
2 User picks IdP     
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3 Authenticates     
4 Demonstrates access to data     
5 Attempts access different 
protected services within the 
Federation 
Already authenticated    
6 Demonstrates access to data     
 
Table 2  ESDIN Authentication Use Case 
Actors: Key ESDIN Users of pan-European Geographical Data 
Description: For a wide variety of different reasons, individuals at 
organizations such as the EEA, JRC or EC need to be able to 
access secure INSPIRE Annex 1 compliant download services 
on top of pan-European coverage data at large scales.  The 
data will be accessed via a desktop client.  As this initiative is 
funded through the EuroGeographics led ESDIN project, it is 
assumed that the service providers are mainly European 
NMCAs 
Trigger: Various, user has need for harmonized INSPIRE compliant 
pan-European data 
Preconditions: 1. Pan-European harmonized INSPIRE Annex 1 compliant 
large scale data available from cooperating NMCAs via 
basic WFS 
2. Bi-lateral arrangements between NMCAs in cases where 
x-border data requests made 
3. The users organisation and the ExM WFS service provider 
are part of the same access management federation.  In 
this case, the ESDIN Federation. 
4. User has access to a desktop client capable of undergoing 
the Shibboleth/SAML interactions 
Postconditions: 1. User has been authenticated and authorized 
2. Data has been delivered to the users WFS client 
application 
Normal Flow: 1. Users application issues a GetCapabilities request 
2. User selects their Identity Provider from a list of IdPs 
3. Authenticates 
4. The application issues a GetCapabilities request followed 
by however many DescribeFeatureType, GetFeature 
OGC  11-019r2Open Geospatial Consortium, Inc 
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requests and responses as necessary to satisfy users 
requirements 
Alternative Flows: 1. Single Sign On.  User has recently successfully 
authenticated and accessed either this or another 
federation service and therefore gains immediate access to 
this service without needing to authenticate again.     
Exceptions: 1. User not authorised.  Authorisation exception 
2. Illegal request leading to a service exception 
3. Security exception in case of attack 
Includes:  
Priority: High, being able to securely exchange identity information to 
make authorisation decisions is a fundamental pre-requisite of 
a large number of SDI scenarios 
Frequency of Use: High 
Business Rules:  
Special Requirements:  
Assumptions: It is assumed that a trust federation comprising the ESDIN 
partners and cooperating organisations will have been 
established and is being maintained.  To service x-border 
requests requires infrastructure capable or recognising the 
special case and forwarding to the appropriate WFS.  
Pragmatically, this will require bilateral arrangements 
between NMCAs and prior generation of edge-matched cross-
border data. 
Notes and Issues: A single multi-state Federation is assumed here.  Cross-
federation interoperability is not assumed but is likely to be 
desirable under several scenarios, for example: 
• Where a key user, eg, the EEA, operates its own 
federation-like partnership (European Environment 
Information and Observation Network (EEIONet)). 
• Where a member state has established its own national 
federation for purposes of organising how public 
authorities within that state make their INSPIRE 
compliant services available 
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7 Results 
The period between the end of the OGC Technical Committee in Bonn and the TIE was 
short - just over 7 working weeks.  In this period the following organisations (excepting 
EDINA) listed in Table 3 found time to modify their OWS clients. 
 
Table 3  OSI participants who demonstrated software during the TIE 
 
Type of 
Client 
Organisation Name 
EDINA 
(opensource) 
Snowflake Cadcorp con terra JRC 
(opensource) 
Envitia 
WMS Browser, 
Desktop, 
Proxy 
 Desktop Proxy Browser Desktop 
WFS Desktop Desktop Desktop Proxy   
 
Note the range of different OWS clients demonstrated: 
− Proprietary and open source 
− Desktop, browser and proxy (EDINA server-side, con terra client-side) 
That the approach works was further demonstrated by using an additional separate test 
federation established in-house by the BKG (the German National Mapping and 
Cadastral Agency). 
The following conclusions can tentatively be drawn: 
− Using Shibboleth to protect OWS is practical 
− Not particularly difficult on the server side (effectively it is a straightforward 
Shibboleth installation). 
− Browser based OWS clients are not particularly difficult to modify to be able to 
undergo the Shibboleth/SAML interactions 
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− More subtle with desktop based clients, but possible with some effort in a 
relatively short space of time.   Especially with assistance to hand and access to a 
reference implementation 
− Highly likely community support and tooling will be available if decision is taken 
to operationalise this organisational model for SDI. 
The following sections provide more detail from each software producing OSI participant 
concerning their own experience in creating a Shibboleth enabled client during the IE. 
7.1 EDINA 
On behalf of the ESDIN consortium, EDINA initiated the Shibboleth IE on behalf of the 
ESDIN consortium based on much prior experience.  Much of the relevant information, 
eg, FAQ, source code, debugging assistance, is available from the following URL under 
the Identity Management heading: 
http://esdin.fgi.fi/wiki/index.php/Main_Page#Identity_management 
7.2 Envitia 
Envitia supply world class geospatial technologies to customers in mission critical 
applications, enabling enhanced decision support through the integration of disparate data 
sources.  We do this through our Envitia GI Web Services offering and our MapLink Pro 
developer kit. A key focus is on information integration for the provision cross-
community situational awareness. To meet business goals the sources Envitia has to 
integrate are more and more often being delivered by on-line resources protected by 
proprietary mechanisms, and often have complex access restrictions which need to be 
taken into account in any solution delivery. In addition there is often a range of 
architectural approaches used to deploy our software, with solutions being deployed on a 
range of operating systems and environments and involving both light clients (browser 
based solutions) and fully deployed applications.  
A particular problem is having an adequate source of user identity in order to 
allow/disallow access, and different sources typically have specific communities 
responsible for identity management. Having a methodology to deal with this diversity in 
identity information effectively across a range of delivery solutions and providers is 
essential for long term information integration which is a key element of our offerings. A 
solution which requires for example the user to repeatedly log in for each source is highly 
detrimental to an efficient workflow, and so we are keen to avoid this. It also complicates 
the access management within the application itself (and also to some degree be 
undesirable from a security perspective) if the client application had to maintain the 
various identities/passwords for the user for different sources. Given our keen interest in 
open standards based solutions, we were drawn to the SAML Standard and to the 
Shibboleth implementation in particular to support federated identity and solve many of 
these problems.  
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Many organisations are looking at providing SAML compliant services, and our belief is 
that if our client software libraries, among others, support SAML 2.0 this will encourage 
adoption by service provider organisations. As a specialist technology provider Envitia 
sees the success of open standards as very important element of exploiting our 
technology, and this is an additional reason for our interest and support of the Shibboleth 
Interoperability Experiment.Clearly we cannot have control over resources produced and 
maintained by third parties; but Shibboleth offers these third parties a way to support 
single sign-on without significant work on their part and also without modifying their 
existing service implementation.   This approach is much easier to “sell” than one which 
requires more significant implementation changes. 
7.2.1 Envitia Experimentation with SAML/ECP Profile 
Envitia had been experimenting with SAML 2.0 (or more specifically the Shibboleth 
implementation of SAML 2.0) as a means to protect web services produced by Envitia 
and to support Federated Security Single-Sign-On for other resources when this 
experiment was identified to us. Prior to the Shibboleth Interoperability Experiment, 
Envitia had successfully prototyped the necessary parts of  SAML (2.0) to protect Envitia 
GI Web services accessed by a browser based application and by our own client (via the 
ECP Protocol). This was part of internal on-going research and development.  
Whilst supporting SAML 2.0 in a web browser environment is relatively straight forward 
(as it is handled by the browser, and the JavaScript has little to do), web portals on 
browsers are only one way that distributed resources can be accessed.   For high 
performance, desktop applications are the normal approach.   In these cases the SAML 
Web Browser SSO profile is not appropriate and alternative mechanisms are required. 
Envitia’s MapLink product, which already provides client interfaces to the WMS and 
WFS service types, was extended to support SAML Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP) 
exchanges. We also defined a use case and produced a demonstration application which 
used the client library in order to demonstrate that federated identity would work. The 
client application was written in C++ using the beta Maplink Pro V7 SDK running on a 
Windows environment (MapLink Pro 7.0 is due for release in Q3 2011). 
To support understanding of the mechanisms involved the ECP Client application was 
developed against the same test federation that Envitia used to evaluate the use of SSO in 
a browser environment. Having full access to both the server and client environments 
significantly improved support for debugging the client code. It is important to note that 
no changes were made to the test federation environment (ECP support was included as 
part of the initial Shibboleth configuration at the SP layer.) 
We were, though, interested in the possibility of testing with other federations supporting 
SAML2 as this is always a better test in a community than simply depending on purely 
internal implementations/configurations alone. As a result we joined the Shibboleth IE as 
an ECP Client provider. 
OGC  11-019r2Open Geospatial Consortium, Inc 
16 Copyright © 2012 Open Geospatial Consortium 
 
7.2.2 Engagement in the Shibboleth IE 
Envitia took part in the OGC Shibboleth Interoperability Experiment (ShibIE) to 
subjectively, at least, validate our implementation in the client of mechanisms to manage 
Federated Security and single sign on.   As part of ShibIE, Envitia tested the ECP client 
described above using the MapLink Pro SDK against the Federated Security and SSO 
framework set up as part of the experiment. It is important to note that no changes were 
made to the test federation environment provided under the experiment (ECP support was 
included as part of the initial Shibboleth configuration at the SP layer). 
The diagram below shows the general behaviour of the ECP client with the Identity 
Provider (IDP) and Service Provider (SP) 
 
Figure 3 - ECP Profile Exchanges 
The test application accessed the WMS resource as normal (in the initial case with a 
standard WMS GetCapabilities request).  Instead of returning the WMS resource as 
would be expected in an unprotected resource the service provider returned an ECP 
challenge.   The client received the response and identified this as an ECP authentication 
request.  To support the authentication the client application needed to communicate with 
an appropriate Identity Provider.  Available Identity Providers were obtained from the 
associated federation metadata loaded by the client. 
The diagram below shows a screen shot of the client application which identifies the 
service request, a check box to inform the client that the client would be using the ECP 
profile , the location of the meta data and a list of the IDPs available in the metatdata. 
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Figure 4 IDP Selection 
The authentication request received from the SP needed to be modified to remove (and 
temporarily store) the header information before forwarding the request, together with 
username and password, to the IDP.  The authentication response from the IDP was then 
edited to re-insert elements from the original authentication request. Specifically these 
were the RelayState (if present) and its associated attributes (actor, mustunderstand)  and 
the RefToMessageID attribute associated with the Request. Care had to be taken to 
ensure that merging operation does not invalidate the XML document, this included 
avoiding additional whitespace and other apparently unimportant formatting information.  
The modified response was then sent back to the original SP and if the user attributes 
were appropriate the SP returned the originally requested information. 
Future calls to the protected resource were dealt with using cookies managed by the 
underlying HTTP libraries.  The diagram below presents the WMS data as would be 
expected through an unprotected service. 
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Figure 5 WMS Map Display 
The behaviour of how requests to other resources protected by the federation are dealt 
with is dependent on the client implementation. 
7.2.3 Envitia Conclusions 
The use of the SAML 2.0 ECP profile appears to be a viable mechanism for dealing with 
federated security over a range of disparate resources. At the client side there were no 
Shibboleth specific requirements that needed to be incorporated and in principle the 
solution implemented in the Envitia SDKs for the ECP Client should operate with any 
SAML2 compliant implementation. The protected resources against which testing was 
carried out did utilise the Shibboleth components, so it is not possible to say how the 
client would handle other SAML ECP profile implementations.  Comparative testing 
would need to be carried out on other SAML ECP implementations, however, the 
expectation is that there should be little or no modification required at the client side to 
handle other implementations that adhere to the profile. 
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One issue identified with the testing performed in this trial, was that it was a positive 
rather than a negative test. The goal was to prove that it did work rather than examine 
vulnerabilities. This is obviously a target requirement for a future trial. 
7.3 Joint Research Centre (JRC) - Implementation of Shibboleth-based protected OGC 
Web Map Services and their access from the INSPIRE GeoPortal 
The Open Geospatial Consortium (OGC®) launched on 31st August 2010 the Shibboleth 
Interoperability Experiment (IE) to advance best practice for implementing standards on 
federated security in transactions involving geospatial data and services. 
The aim of the IE was to demonstrate the use of Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML) with OGC Web Services, including use of Shibboleth. The IE was built on best 
practices from the European Spatial Data Infrastructure Network (ESDIN) project and on 
results from previous OGC initiatives on authentication.  Shibboleth is an open source 
software package released by the Internet2 Consortium based on the SAML standard 
from OASIS. 
Federated security is relevant for INSPIRE network services therefore it was decided to 
participate in this IE. In this document we report on the work performed and the 
knowledge gained through our participation in the shibboleth interoperability experiment.  
The JRC contribution focused on a) the implementation of a Shibboleth-based protection 
system for OGC web mapping services (WMS) and b) accessing protected WMS from 
the INSPIRE Geoportal. Our experiment was twofold: 
1. Server side: installation and configuration of a Shibboleth Service Provider (SP) 
(to protect a WMS service) and an Identity Provider (IdP) ;  
2. Client side: adding support for Shibboleth protected WMS services to the 
INSPIRE Geoportal Viewer application. 
The JRC contribution was wider to what was initially requested by the OGC Shibboleth 
IE. Having the possibility to work in this field, we took the opportunity to explore 
additional use cases and perform experiments that were initially out of scope of the 
Shibboleth experiment. 
7.3.1 Use Cases 
To test support for protected services from within the INSPIRE Geoportal Viewer 
application five use cases were developed. 
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1. Add protected WMS service “A” (not member of any federation2) to Viewer map; 
2. Add protected WMS service “B” from federation “Federation1” to Viewer map; 
3. Add protected WMS service “C” from federation “Federation1” to Viewer map 
while service “B” is in use; 
4. Add protected WMS service “D” from federation “Federation2” to Viewer map 
while services “A” and “B” are in use by the Viewer; 
5. Add non-protected WMS “E” to the Viewer map while protected services are 
there. 
Use cases in more detail 
1. When accessing a protected WMS “A” from the INSPIRE geoportal viewer, users 
should be redirected to identity provider (IdP) page/form, specified in the 
Shibboleth Service Provider (SP) metadata for WMS ”A”. After entering 
username and password for IdP of WMS “A” and the user is authenticated 
successfully, the WMS layers are added to the geoportal viewer. Follow up 
requests to WMS “A” from the geoportal viewer do not require further 
authentication. It is worth noting that this use case does not follow the “IdP 
initiated SSO” paradigm. It is possible to consider it as part of an “SP initiated 
SSO” flow (the flow begins with WMS “A” which is a SP). However, as already 
mentioned, we do not consider WMS “A” inside a federation, so we do not 
consider this a SSO. It just implements a normal logon procedure. We developed 
this use case to demonstrate the ability of INSPIRE Geoportal to access a 
protected WMS, since the original Geoportal implementation (before the 
experiment) could only access unprotected WMS. Thus, the Geoportal does not 
play a role as IdP nor SP in this use case. 
2. When accessing a protected WMS “B”, users can enter/select a federation 
resource endpoint, proposed by the geoportal interface – “Federation1”. 
(Federation for Shibboleth - resource where linkage for number of IdP and SP 
providers specified). The geoportal viewer shows the page/form for IdP selection 
based on what is proposed by “Federation1”. After entering username and 
password for the selected IdP of WMS “B” and successfully authenticated, the 
WMS layers are added to the geoportal viewer. Follow up requests to WMS “B” 
from the geoportal viewer do not require further authentication. 
3. When accessing protected WMS “C”, users can enter/select federation resource 
endpoint, as proposed by the geoportal viewer interface – “Federation1”. 
                                                 
2 We consider this is not a federation because the IdP and the SP are from the same organisation (JRC). Technically, it 
behaves the same as if the IdP and the SP are from different organisations (but those organisations are in the same 
federation) without the need of the Discovery Service. 
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Assuming that there is still an active login session running (e.g., the session 
previously started when WMS “B” has been added to the viewer map), WMS “C” 
will be added without additional sign-on (SP initiated SSO within a single 
federation). Here users attempt to access a resource on another SP in the same 
federation. They already have a current logon session on this federation and they 
do not need to log on again. 
4. When accessing protected WMS “D”, users can enter/select a federation resource 
endpoint, proposed by geoportal viewer interface – “Federation2”. The geoportal 
viewer shows the page/form for IdP selection based on what is proposed by 
“Federation2”. After entering username and password for selected IdP of WMS 
“D” and authenticated successfully, WMS is added to the geoportal viewer. 
Follow up requests to WMS “D” from the geoportal do not require additional 
authentication. We are now in the area of inter-federation interoperability, a use 
case developed considering potential requirements from the INSPIRE geoportal 
and was out of scope for the IE. In fact, in the frame of the IE the BKG federation 
was used merely as an extra way of demonstrating that the client software worked 
properly with any federation. 
5. When accessing an endpoint of a non-protected WMS “E” while a number of 
protected services have been added to the viewer, users can work with maps of 
both protected and no-protected WMS services layers till the session for protected 
services is ended. 
7.3.2 Testing architecture 
The prototype Geoportal map viewer has two components: a Java Web Service 
component (a proxy) and a Browser Client component. Shibboleth needs to be supported 
on both components with different approaches. 
Server side 
The Shibboleth Service Provider version 2.3.1 was installed and configured for Windows 
Server 2008 32-bit with IIS 7.5. A WMS (version 1.3.0) was provided by ArcGIS Server 
10. For testing purposes the Shibboleth protected services have been published internally. 
The Shibboleth IdP and the LDAP server were installed and configured on another 
Windows Server 2008 32-bit machine. To create a connection between the Java 
application running on client side and the IdP, the latter needs to support SAML 
Enhanced Client or Proxy (ECP). We decided to use the Shibboleth ECP extension 
provided with the software. Shibboleth SP for IIS should be installed with the ISAPI 
filter option enabled. To make ECP work, SP should be properly configured. SP and IdP 
have been successfully tested with GetCapabilities and GetMap requests using Web 
browsers. 
Client side 
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The INSPIRE GeoPortal Viewer (a web application developed using JavaScript - 
OpenLayers and ExtJs- for the client part and Java for the application part) was 
configured to support WMS protected with Shibboleth. Even though for testing purposes 
the implementation of Shibboleth protected WMS covered only some aspects, we tested 
it using the https://www.georm.org/service/WorldMap? WMS, together with the EDINA 
Test IdP and a test account3. Figure 7 is a mash-up of a couple of screenshots taken from 
one of the running tests. 
 
Figure 6: Enable Shibboleth support for Java Web Service 
                                                 
3 From http://esdin.fgi.fi/wiki/index.php/Esdin:AuthIE:Client 
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Figure 7: INSPIRE GEOPORTAL Viewer client notify user that accessed resource 
is protected and (on the right) the user is redirected to a defined Federation site, 
where IdP can be selected 
7.3.3 Experienced issues 
Implementing the testing architecture we run into some issues. Firstly, with Shibboleth 
IdP ver. 2.2 and SP ver. 2.3.1 there were some issues on Windows 64-bit machines, so we 
decided to use Windows Server 2008 32-bit machines for the geoportal Discovery and 
Shibboleth SP/IdP. Secondly, we experienced also many problems with the so called 
“same origin policy”4. This policy prevents a document or script loaded from one origin 
from getting or setting properties of a document coming from another origin. The 
Geoportal domain is certainly different from the Shibboleth SP and IdP domains, so the 
policy prevents the GeoPortal’s JavaScript code to get information from them. Thus, it is 
not possible to know if a user is already logged in or not and therefore we can’t provide 
the login feature in proper time. Some options, tested to overcome this issue are as 
follows: 
1. The login feature or login guide is not provided at all. Let users manage their 
logged in session themselves. 
2. Deploy the service at a Shibboleth aware container and protect the service. At the 
same time configure the Shibboleth SP to join a Federation (the Shibboleth SP 
can not join more than one Federation at the same time). In this approach, the 
session is managed by Shibboleth SP and we don’t need to write any code. 
                                                 
4 https://developer.mozilla.org/en/Same_origin_policy_for_JavaScript 
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3. The same origin policy can be solved by using the Cross-Origin Resource Sharing 
(CORS) approach www.w3.org/TR/cors/. All SPs should be configured to use 
CORS. But it only solves partly the Shibboleth issue: when a user tries to access a 
Shibboleth protected service, the browser needs to be redirected in a complex way 
which XMLHttpRequest does not support. So we need what is called image hack: 
raise a request to a document but put it inside an image request. This image 
request can follow complex redirection and creates cookies in the browser.  
Finally, to enable Shibboleth for a Java application, we used the library from Edina5. The 
original Edina library is used for the client side, but the GeoPortal component runs on 
server side, so it was necessary to adapt it to our structure. We are aware of the fact that it 
could become a security risk but we needed to remain compatible with the application 
structure already in place: one on server side and one on client side and both of them 
need to connect to the WMS. The component on the server side cannot use credentials 
from the client side because it has to serve many clients at the same time. As the service 
might serve many clients at the same time, it should be always logged into Shibboleth IdP 
and the logging process should be transparent to the end-user. 
7.3.4 Results and future work 
The use cases above were developed and demonstrated during the “plugfest” that took 
place on the 18th of November 2010 as described in section 6.  In addition to the 
Engineering Report, the IE was also presented at the Security WG session during the 
recent OGC Technical Committee meeting in Bonn and available at 
http://portal.opengeospatial.org/files/?artifact_id=43044.  
Moreover, at JRC we will investigate the possibility to extend the architecture we put in 
place for the aims of this experiment based on the authentication-authorisation-
accounting (AAA) technologies employed (if required) by the EU Member States for the 
Network Services. 
8 Conclusions 
Interoperability Experiments are, by definition, focussed on specific interoperability 
problems of concern and interest to the OGC membership.  This IE was focussed on the 
use of SAML Access Management Federations as a means of securing OWS across 
administrative domains so that only properly authenticated principals get access to 
protected resources.  Specifically, it focussed on the use of the open source Shibboleth 
“reference implementation” of SAML.    
Technically, the participants have proven this is feasible and that a range of client 
software can be modified (with varying degrees of difficulty) to be able to undergo the 
                                                 
5 Available at http://esdin.fgi.fi/wiki/index.php/Desktop_client_for_protected_WMS/WFS_Services 
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Shibboleth/SAML interactions.  Some of this client software is available as open source 
and others proprietary – some of the latter is now available commercially. 
Establishing access management federations is however a non-trivial task – there are 
significant political, legal, organisational and financial implications.  If the consensus is 
that this kind of parallel security infrastructure based on SAML is a necessary 
concomitant of SDI where protected resources are involved, then the technology is their 
and demonstrably works; it does not require changes to the OGC specifications and, in 
the case of Shibboleth, is already in use by a user base numbered in the tens of millions.   
Part of the value of maintaining focus and a “separation of concerns” is that it makes 
problems tractable.  There are a large number of related areas of concern and interest to 
the GI industry, eg, Geo Rights Management, e-commerce, authorisation, electronic 
licencing, licence negotiation, etc.  If SAML access management federations gain 
widespread acceptance as the preferred means of securely exchanging identity 
information then it is likely to provide a solid, standards based foundation for making 
progress in these related areas.   
